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Carlos Arturo Villagran Sandoval
Introduction Constitutionalism, regionalism and international law all may be used to embed elite influence and corporate power with weak political accountability. One way in which this occurs is through the influence of elites in creating legal facades and distorting essential elements of liberal governance for their own benefit. There is growing literature on the influence of private actors and the role of the law in entrenching social and economic inequality through the process of designing market conditions and trade. 1 Yet, the role and methods of how these elites participate in the process of state-building, law-making, judicial reasoning and policy-design from a multilevel legal standpoint has not yet been fully sketched. Moreover, little is discussed on how the interaction of international law with domestic legal systems can be used to entrench an economic regime which excludes political accountability. This article provides evidence on how liberal concepts, such as judicial independence, can entrench a system of benefits for elites through their informal influence. It also provides evidence of how the selective use of international law is used to avoid political scrutiny.
