In a gesture presented as sovereignist, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger announced in a joint communiqué on 22 September 2025 their withdrawal from the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC). Led by three States currently ruled by military juntas, the decision forms part of a redefinition of their international alignment and raises questions about the place of international criminal justice in transitional regimes seeking political consolidation. Beyond the political gesture, the announcement revives tensions between sovereignty, international justice, and the protection of victims of serious crimes.
A legally framed political decision
The three countries, governed by juntas resulting from coups d’État (2020-2023), have joined forces in a confederation, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), founded by a treaty adopted in Niamey on 6 July 2024. They sought to assert a so-called “sovereignist” line by proclaiming in their joint communiqué that the withdrawal from the ICC applies “with immediate effect”. In this regard, however, the Rome Statute provides a specific mechanism. According to Article 127, withdrawal takes effect only one year after written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the depositary of the treaty. Furthermore, withdrawal does not relieve States of their obligations arising while they were parties (including financial ones), does not affect the cooperation due for investigations and proceedings initiated before the withdrawal took effect, and does not prevent the ICC from continuing to examine cases already initiated. In other words, at this stage, cooperation remains legally binding for the Sahelian States – which ratified the Rome Statute on 16 August 2000 (Mali), 11 April 2002 (Niger), and 16 April 2004 (Burkina Faso) respectively – particularly regarding the situation in Mali, under investigation since 2013 following the State referral of July 2012.
The three States justified their decision by denouncing neo-colonial and selective justice. This long-standing criticism has been echoed within the African Union and by certain major non-party powers, such as the United States and Russia, which have imposed sanctions against the ICC. Yet this argument obscures two realities. First, the ICC is a court of last resort, subsidiary in nature, which intervenes only where national authorities are unwilling or unable to act, in accordance with the principle of complementarity at the heart of the Rome Statute. Second, many situations investigated by the ICC were opened at the request of African States themselves, which weakens the claim of systematic targeting.
The withdrawal decision is also part of a broader restructuring of the diplomacy of the three Sahelian States: exit from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on 29 January 2025, consolidation of the AES as a confederation, distancing from Western partners and closer ties to Russia. However, in international criminal matters, the assertion of sovereignty is not measured by the ability to escape constraints; it is verified by the ability of each State to judge, independently and in accordance with the law, the perpetrators of the most serious crimes.
Between a judicial vacuum and the promise of “endogenous” justice
This disengagement from the ICC by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger is viewed as worrying by numerous non-governmental organisations, since it weakens the multilateral system of criminal justice and raises the question of credible national alternatives. Amnesty International has qualified this decision as a “serious backwards” in the fight against impunity in the Sahel, calling on the three States to reconsider their position. Human Rights Watch has emphasised that the withdrawal will deprive victims of an essential international avenue and increase risks for civilians. TRIAL International has also warned of a weakened access to justice and the risks of non-cooperation.
It is worth recalling that, despite its limitations, the ICC retains crucial functions not only of deterrence – admittedly imperfect, but real in prolonged conflict contexts – but also of pacification and reparation. In this regard, the Malian example illustrates the ICC’s crucial role as a safety net. In 2016, the Court convicted Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment for the destruction of the mausoleums of Timbuktu, recognising the justiciability of attacks on cultural heritage in a situation of armed conflict and paving the way for victims’ reparations.
Regarding this country, Eduardo González Cueva, United Nations Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali, stated shortly after the withdrawal announcement that this decision amounted to a denial of justice to victims of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, due to the risk of hindering access to justice and reparations. He recalled that the Malian State remains obliged to cooperate fully with the ICC for investigations and proceedings ongoing or initiated before the withdrawal’s effective date; failure to comply with this obligation would constitute a breach of international law. Calling on the Malian authorities to reconsider their decision, he further emphasised the risk of a judicial vacuum: in a national context weakened by violence, abandoning international accountability mechanisms could increase impunity and undermine the protection of populations.
To counter criticism, the AES has promoted the construction of an “endogenous” justice and announced the creation of an AES Criminal and Human Rights Court intended to prosecute serious crimes in accordance with its “societal values”. While the ambition is legitimate, insofar as geographic and cultural proximity can improve access to justice, three major pitfalls emerge.
Firstly, capacity and resources: establishing a regional criminal court demands budgetary guarantees, witness protection mechanisms, specialised investigative services, a registry, and a properly resourced defence. In the short term, the financial and logistical sustainability of such an institution is uncertain.
Secondly, independence and safeguards: in contexts of military government, the independence of judges, the autonomy of the prosecution service, and the protection of lawyers are not guaranteed. Without strong safeguards, the perception of a judicial system being instrumentalised would compromise the credibility of decisions.
Thirdly, institutional coordination: a Sahelian criminal court would need to be integrated into an already dense African judicial ecosystem, without creating conflicts of jurisdiction, particularly with the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR), as amended by the Malabo Protocol (2014), which provides for a criminal section, but is not yet in force due to insufficient ratifications. The challenge is to avoid fragmentation and forum shopping. This is where the criticisms of non-governmental organisations take on their full meaning. Indeed, in the absence of a credible operational alternative, victims’ access to an effective remedy is drastically reduced. These withdrawals – like those of Burundi in 2017 and the Philippines in 2019, and that of Hungary expected to take effect in 2026 – mark sovereignist retreats that undermine the universality of the fight against impunity championed by the ICC.
It is worth recalling here that the ICC is not the enemy of sovereignty: it is its auxiliary when national jurisdictions are prevented from acting. Complementarity is not tutelage; it is an incentive to strengthen national institutions. The desirable outcome is therefore neither withdrawal nor hostility, but a concerted reform of cooperation mechanisms, the strengthening of national and regional justice systems, and the maintenance of victim protection as a guiding principle. This reformist approach is also advocated by several African voices which, while criticising real or perceived biases, call for improving the institution rather than abandoning it.
Ultimately, the withdrawal of the Sahelian States from the ICC is less a matter of sovereign resurgence than a strategy of judicial avoidance with high costs for victims. In the short term, it erases neither ongoing investigations nor existing obligations. In the medium term, it weakens a pillar of the multilateral accountability system without, for the time being, offering a suitable alternative. Sovereignty is demonstrated by rendering justice – swiftly, independently, and effectively – not by evading accountability. The credibility of criminal justice in the Sahel will depend less on statements than on the ability to investigate and judge, as close as possible to the victims, crimes that offend the international community as a whole, with the ICC’s support where necessary.
