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Farah Y
Introduction
The High Court decision in Limbu v Dyson tests the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens (‘FNC’) in international human rights litigation for the first time since the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.1 Until the UK-EU Withdrawal Treaty, the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) on the application of FNC was stated in Owasu v Jackson where the Court ruled that national courts are not permitted to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens (‘FNC’) where the defendant is domiciled in an EU member state2, and the subject matter of the dispute falls within the scope of Brussels I3. As a result, in many international human rights litigation cases the jurisdiction of the English court over a company deemed domiciled in the UK under Article 63 of Brussels I could not have been disputed on the basis that England was not the appropriate forum.4 In Vedanta for instance, the allegation that England was FNC was only raised in relation to the request to join into the proceedings Vedanta’s Zambian based Subsidiary under jurisdictional gateway 3.1(3) of Practice Directive 6B5. The same could not have been argued in relation to the parent company (Vendanta Plc) which was deemed domiciled in the UK.6 Following the withdrawal from the EU, the UK repealed Brussels I, restoring the application of English conflict of laws rules and with it the doctrine of FNC, which will now apply even to cases brought against a corporation with presence in the UK.